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These three papers demonstrate the fragility and backwardness of 
Latin A m erica’s textile business in the late colonial era. In Peru, the 
m anufactories (obrajes) of H uam anga employed debt peons (yanaconas) 
to produce rough woolens with backward implements for a market that 
depended on forced sales to unwilling consumers by corrupt officials. In 
Bolivia, the Cochabam ba boom in cottage cottons relied on wartime 
conditions to open markets that would otherwise have found better qual­
ity products at lower prices from  foreign suppliers. In Mexico, the 
woolen industry virtually disappeared over the course of the eighteenth 
century, while the revival of cotton textile production in Puebla depended 
on poverty, rather than technological advance, and nearly succumbed to 
peace and free trade well before Independence.
T he case of the H uam anga obrajes, ably sketched by Salas, may be 
the most depressing of all. T he  decline of the industry in the seventeenth 
century provided ample opportunity for closing these enterprises once 
and for all. D ata are lacking on the dimensions of the eighteenth century 
revival before the 1760’s, but the importance of bloc sales to the
corregidores (which Salas’ data may underestim ate, since a portion of the 
market sales may also have gone to these officials) brought the boom to 
an end when the T úpac A m aru revolt forced the abolition of the
repartimientos. In Mexico, where forced sales were less common, the
woolen industry died a natural death much earlier, as Salvucci’s recent 
study has show n.1
T he cotton boom in Cochabam ba, by contrast, did not depend on 
official favor. Indeed, as Larson shows, colonial governments could not 
be persuaded to help the industry at all. Permission to grow cotton in the 
area, to free the industry depended at least as much on government 
decisions taken in M adrid, for it boomed only when Spain blundered into 
w ar with Britain in 1796. Unlike H uam anga, however, tocuyo produc­
tion rem ained a cottage industry that purchased inputs, hired labor, 
borrowed capital, and sold products in competitive markets without the 
aid of political controls and coercion.
Taken together, these two case studies demonstrate the hopeless
malaise of Andean industry. Neither official favor, nor market forces
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proved sufficient to stimulate the development of an enduring industrial 
base. Primitive technology produced goods of inferior quality and higher 
cost than foreign competitors. Woolens could even be displaced by 
decently made domestic cotton cloth, as Salas points out. Cochabam ba 
cotton cloth had difficulty competing with imports from  Q uito , let alone 
Britain. Together, these studies highlight the fate of marginal industries 
in the more backward regions of Spanish America.
T he case of Mexico is more complicated. As T hom son’s superb case 
study shows, Puebla’s cotton textile production lasted longer, developed a 
more complex division of labor, and produced goods of higher quality 
than H uam anga or C ochabam ba. Although cotton production declined 
when peace broke out in the 1810’s, and declined further during the first 
decades of Independence, it did not disappear. Factory production began 
to displace artisans as early as the 1830’s and boomed during the 
Porfirian era. In  Peru, the first cotton factories were not set up in Lima 
untii the 1850’s, and quickly went bankrupt when the government 
abandoned protectionist tariffs.^ Puebla’s advantages over H uam anga 
and Cochabam ba merit more extended discussion.
Although Thom son cites the limitations of the market for Puebla’s 
cottons as a factor in its unsteady growth and late colonial decline, 
M exico’s market appears to have been fa r larger and much more stable 
than in the two Andean cases. At least part of the reason for this 
contrast may lie in the different levels of productivity of the two regions. 
W hile precise data for Peru are lacking, qualitative evidence suggests 
that per capita product was substantially lower in the Andes than in 
Mexico in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. A ndean textile 
industries thus faced a much smaller market, consisting mainly of urban 
laborers earning cash incomes until forced sales (H uam anga) and war 
(Cochabam ba) created tem porary booms. In Mexico, on the other hand, 
Puebla marketed its products throughout the colony to a more numerous 
clientele and the industry’s success promoted textile development in 
competing centers like Q uerétaro , G uadalajara and Mexico City. In 
short, the greater productivity of the M exican economy and the con­
sequent higher per capita income of its population, helped to stimulate a
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larger and more stable industry.
I t is also possible that Puebla’s cotton textile industry made more 
productive use of its resources. U nfortunately, none of these studies 
present sufficient data for measuring industry productivity. T hus, it is 
impossible to compare them to each other or to the European textile 
industries of the same period. W hile both Larson and Thom son may be
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on solid ground when they cite foreign competition as a critical variable 
in determ ining the success or failure of the industries they study, a 
quantitative test of this proposition could produce interesting results. 
Neither study provides a detailed analysis of the cost structure of cotton 
production. T he conventional inference -  that backward technology was 
at fault (and thus shortage of capital or entrepreneurial unreason) -  
does not, however, explain much. W alker’s brilliant study of the M ira - 
ñores factory in the 1840’s and 1850’s demonstrated that the high price 
and uncertain supply of cotton (and political conflicts over im port p n r- 
hibitions on the raw material) were mainly to blame for this pioneering 
failure in M exico.4
W hile none of these papers depart radically from conventional 
accounts of the failure of industry in colonial Latin America, together 
they assault a num ber of commonly -  held beliefs about the causes of 
that failure. M ost interesting in this regard is L arson’s perceptive 
analysis of the C ochabam ba case. Cotton production in this area 
expanded dramatically after 1796. No lack of capital, manpower, 
equipm ent or even raw material impeded the expansion. G overnm ent 
support was lacking, but then so was government interference. In the 
case of Puebla T hom son’s study demonstrates a similar elasticity. 
O pportunities to expand production found avid entrepreneurs, abundant 
capital, and a plentiful supply of labor. Even in H uam anga, the owners 
of the obrajes managed to increase production rapidly, within fixed limits 
at each installation, beginning in the 1760’s. All this suggests that some 
of the constraints on industrial growth, alleged in the literature, especially 
lack of capital, entrepreneurship, m anagerial skill and labor, need to be 
substantially revised.
Thom son offers an interesting alternative model to explain the failure 
of the Puebla industries to continue growing after the w ar years. He 
follows other analysts in linking textile production to factors affecting the 
competitiveness of Puebla’s industry in the face of foreign competition. 
In periods when silver exports increased the colony’s capacity to import 
and when peace faciliated foreign trade, Puebla’s production fell. W hen 
silver production declined or international w ar prevented its export and 
simultaneously impeded im ports, Puebla grew. In this, Puebla shared 
with C ochabam ba an inability to face British competition (though the 
Cochabam ba industry was much less durable).
Thom son adds two other elements to the model: physical and hum an 
geography. The physical geography of Mexico impeded trade and frag­
mented markets by making lo n g -d is tan ce  commerce costly. By hum an
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geography Thom son means the poverty of the mass of the population. 
These two factors operated as constants to depress the general level of 
the economy and therfore of Puebla’s production possibilities. H ere, too, 
M exico’s fate was shared by that of the Andean colonies, though it 
appears that transport costs and general poverty were greater in the 
Andes (and industry, therefore, more fragile and backward).
T hus to explain the relative backwardness of the Puebla cotton 
industry Thom son cites two constants that put a ceiling on expansion 
possibilities and two variables that explain fluctuations over the short 
term  in the industry’s fortunes. T he relationship between Thom son’s two 
constants is problematical, however, because transport costs contributed 
to the low level of productivity of the economy, and thus to the poverty 
of the population. T hat is, hum an geography derived in part from 
physical geography. But geography alone cannot explain the relative 
backwardness of the economies of colonial Latin America. And the 
problem is not solved, of course, by adding foreign competition. A full 
theory would need to explain why Spanish colonial industries were vul­
nerable to foreign competition in the first place, why M anchester led the 
industrial revolution, not Puebla. G eography (hum an or physical) is a 
start, but it is not sufficient. Perhaps, although Thom son rejects the 
notion explicitly, the archaic institutional famework of colony and mother 
country alike can add a critical element to the analysis.
Thom son argues persuasively that Puebla’s textile production was 
favored, rather than harm ed, by the policies of the colonial state in the 
eighteenth century. Prohibitions on the import of Asian cotton and silk, 
the removal of the alcabala on raw cotton, and the prohibition on the 
import of cotton cloth from  other European countries helped to protect 
the Puebla industry, though they simultaneously encouraged competition 
from C atalan cottons. Thom son offers no m easure of P uebla’s net 
benefits from  these policies, so it is possible, if unlikely, that Puebla’s 
gains were more than offset by those of Catalonia (indeed, that was the 
objective of the policies). But the only evidence Thom son cites of state 
intervention in the industry that did not encourage output involved the 
arrest of a few weavers for violating guild rules that usually went unen­
forced.
O n the other hand, since his argum ent depends so critically on the 
assumption that narrow consumer markets retarded the industry, 
Thom son now needs to examine more fully the relationship between 
poverty and the full range of public policies before passing final judge­
ment on the im portance of the state in impeding industrial growth. The
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Bourbon state, for example, used colonial revenues to promote the min­
ing industry in a period of rising marginal costs. T he effect was to drain 
resources from other sectors of the economy to keep mining output ris­
ing.5 And the effect, Thom son says, of high silver production in peace­
time was to favor foreign competition and depress Puebla. Suppose the 
viceregal government had ended subsidies to the mining industry and 
used fiscal revenues to improve the deplorable condition of the colony’s 
highway network instead of exporting the surpluses to subsidize Spanish 
rule in the C aribbean and the Phillipines. Thom son’s analysis suggests 
that such policies would have encouraged cotton textile production. If  the 
colonial state systematically distorted resource allocation, as I believe it 
did, and in so doing diminished productivity and thus depressed incomes 
in its colonial possessions, then one need not find police sm ashing looms 
to conclude that industrial development suffered as a result.6 After 
Independence, as W alker has shown, ’’what might have in other 
circumstances marked the birth of a M exican [industrial] bourgeoisie 
resulted stillborn -  the empresarios and their enterprises were caught up 
and strangled by the contradictions of an enduring superstructure that 
refused to be superceded.”^
In all three cases, these studies emphasize the technological back­
wardness of colonial industry. Production methods in H uam anga and 
Cochabam ba scarcely changed over the eighteenth century (although the 
C acam arca obrajes abortive attem pt in the 1760’s to increase the 
quality of its product is suggestive), while cotton ginning lost out to 
traditional carding in Puebla because ginned cotton was less suited to the 
backward spinning techniques of the industry. In short, new methods 
remained either untried or rejected in all three cases.
This technological backwardness of these three textile industries, 
especially in contrast to the British, continental and North American 
cotton textile industries, deserves a final comment. None of the three 
operated at, or even near, contem porary world technical standards. The 
most advanced of the three was the Puebla industry, but the changes 
wrought there involved organization rather than technique, as Thom son 
points out, Puebla rejected mechanically ginned cotton at a time when 
the continental industries used nothing else. Mechanized spinning had 
replaced cottage and hand work in Europe and the United States decades 
before Antuñano created M exico’s first spinning factory in the 1820’s. 
By the time he did, the New England mills had already adopted the 
power loom and mechanized weaving, a development that did not occur 
in Mexico until the 1840’s (and did not become widespread and
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successful, according to Thom son, until the 1890’s). In short, the most 
advanced of the three industries studied here operated at roughly two 
decades to a half century behind the world standard.® T he reasons for 
this technical backwardness require investigation separate from  the ana­
lysis of the rate of growth in production. Increases in output without 
technological advance do not make for successful industrializations. The 
reverse is also true: despite their presumed advantages, both in costs and 
in the quality of output, most of the early factories established in 
Mexico in the 1830’s and 1840’s went bankrupt. Im porting new 
technologies did not guarantee success.
Nonetheless, the continuity in the location of textile production in the 
Puebla region from the era of cottage spinning and hand looms to the 
factory installations of the late nineteenth century suggests a m ajor 
difference between this industry and that of the Andean cases. The 
H uam anga and Cochabam ba industries were marginal operations that 
could only flourish in the artificial hot houses created by forced sales and 
international war. T he Puebla industry, however, was more than that. 
Thom son does not make the standard infant industry argum ent in his 
account of Puebla, and quite rightly. Infant industries in the modern era 
are those that require protection both to increase output and to achieve 
technological parity with foreign competitors. Puebla’s output rose in 
wartime and mining depression (inadvertant protection, to be sure), but 
technological advances failed to materialize. This case, then, resembles 
more the European phase of ’’proto -  industrialization,” characterized 
mainly by organizational rather than technological change, than it does 
the infant industry phase of modern factory development where techno­
logical advances march hand in hand with increases in output. The 
history of textile industry development in Mexico thus suggests points of 
comparison and contrast with the European experience that would richly 
reward the historian, though such an effort would require a separate 
study of quite different scope. T he three studies in this volume, by 
suggesting comparisons across regions withing Latin America, contribute 
in im portant ways to advancing prospects for broader work.
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